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INTERNATIONAL SPACE FORCE
I. INTRODUCTION
ABOVE ALL, we must guard against the misuse of outer
space. We recognized early on that a legal regime was
needed to prevent it [from] becoming another area of
military confrontation. The international community has
acted jointly, through the United Nations, to ensure that
outer space would be developed peacefully. But there is
much more to be done. We must not allow this century, so
plagued with war and suffering, to pass on its legacy to the
next, when the technology at our disposal will be even more
awesome. We cannot view the expanse of space as another
battleground for our earthly conflicts.
- Kofi Anrian,' United Nations Secretary-General
Secretary-General Annan's admonition is particularly poignant when one
recognizes that the international community has already seen its first space
war. General Merrill A. McPeak, former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force,
described the Persian Gulf War as such,2 largely due to the U.S.-led coalition's
exploitation of outer space through the use of military and civilian satellites.
Secretary-General Annan's words articulate an almost incontrovertible
goal---the prevention of war and suffering in the new millennium. More
importantly, they serve as a challenge to those willing to accept it: to find a
way to step peacefully into the new frontier.
The purpose of this note is to evaluate the merits of an international,
collaborative military effort in space. Such a proposition might at first seem
counter intuitive. It is a proposal that calls for the increased militarization3 of
space as a method by which to bring about peace. However, this is not so
surprising if one accepts the inevitability of the full militarization of space. As
noted by author, Bruce Hurwitz, "[t]he militarization of outer space was no
doubt inevitable. Man has militarized every region which he has been able to
' Kofi Annan, World Community Must Leave No One Behind As It Moves to Explore,
Develop Outer Space, Declares UN Secretary-General (visited Jan. 4,2000) (emphasis added)
<http://www.un.or.at/OOSA/unisp-3/speeches/19sgspace.htm>.
2 See Douglas S. Anderson,A Military Look Into Space: The Ultimate High Ground, 1995-
NOV ARMY LAW. 19,20(1995).
' Throughout this paper, the term "militarization" includes all use of space for military
purposes. This is in contrast to certain works which draw a distinction between general
militarization and "weaponization"--the deployment of weapons in space.
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function in (excluding Antarctica)." In light of the inevitable militarization
of space, this proposed international collaboration serves as a pragmatic
vehicle with which to at least control the inevitable escalation of military
activity in space.
Further, this proposal is likely to be considered outside "the box" of
conventional thinking. Yet, when one considers the human carnage wrought
by man throughout history, it would seem irresponsible to leave any conceiv-
able alternative unexplored. Moreover, respected scholars have at least hinted
that an international effort could be the answer to the gravest of dangers facing
the international community. For example, Professor Louis Henkin, a
distinguished international law scholar, has noted with respect to nuclear
weapons that "[n]o nation will wish to give up its nuclear deterrent, unless
perhaps it were to be replaced by some yet-to-be devised, effective, and
reliable internationalforce beyond the ken ofpresent political planning."6
This note seeks to ensure that no option lies "beyond the ken" of those
international players capable of influencing the direction of the international
community. This note is organized into three parts. Initially, it will provide
a sketch of what will hereinafter be referred to as the International Space Force
(ISF). Secondly, it will assess five factors which bear heavily on the proposal
for an ISF. Lastly, the ISF's compatibility with governing law will be
examined.
II. THE ISF: ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS
This section merely provides a sketch of what an ISF might look like by
focusing on its primary attributes. More important than the exact lines of this
sketch, which would admittedly have to be reworked by those more knowl-
edgeable than this author, is the core concept behind the ISF. The concept is
to create a legitimate, international vehicle capable of responding to terrestrial
and extra-terrestrial threats which might be mitigated through military
exploitation of space. The following description will provide the background
necessary to conduct the subsequent discussion regarding whether an ISF is the
proper course of action for the international community.
4 BRUCE A. HuRwlrZ, THE LEGALrrY OF SPACE MiLrmzTIoN 4 (1986).
' As the context would suggest, the "box" refers to thoughts restricted by boundaries.
Boundaries are emplaced by conventional thinking, which only gives credence to methods or
approaches that have gained general acceptance.
6 LouisHENKIN,DARMAMENT: BACKGROUND PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH
HAMMARSKJOLD FORUM 1, 16-17 (Lyman M. Tondel ed. 1964) (emphasis added).
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A. Purpose and Intent
The primary purpose of the ISF is to provide a collective, global defense
against threats to the peace which can be mitigated through limited, military
exploitation of space. The intent is for the ISF to become a reliable defensive
tool in the arsenal of all States.
B. Primary Objectives
The ISF will, in essence, be a limited manpower, permanent United
Nations (U.N.) deterrent force whose orientation, principal assets, and
capabilities lie in space.' Notably, the idea of a "small but permanent" U.N.
force is not a concept original to this paper.8 Various advocates have
frequently argued for such a force. For example, a recent essay viewed the
creation of such a force as a critical step to the U.N. of the future.9 Through
this small force, the ISF will coordinate international energies to accomplish
the following objectives:
1. Creation of a space-based global missile defense.
2. Performance of a comprehensive risk assessment of the risk posed by
extra-terrestrial threats, such as asteroids and comets. . Subject to this
assessment, the ISF may then initiate efforts to create a planetary defense.
3. Establishment of a global communications and early warning system
to be used in such cases as an accidental missile firing.
4. Verification of state compliance with arms control agreements."0
' This force is closely related to a U.N. deterrent action taken in order to "deter aggression
by signaling the international community's willingness to counter it militarily." William J.
Durch, Introduction to THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING 6 (William J. Durch ed. 1993).
Such a deployment requires the consent of the threatened party, which in the case of the ISF,
would be the international community. See id. Most importantly, a deterrent force deploys with
both the capabilities and orders to engage in combat if necessary. See id. Two other related but
distinct U.N. actions are peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping is primarily a
political task, but does include the use of force in limited circumstances including self-defense.
See William J. Dutch, Preface andAcknowledgments to THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING
xii (William J. Durch ed. 1993). In contrast, "peace enforcement" involves the coercive use of
force, such as that employed during the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91, in which economic
sanctions, a blockade, and air, ground, and naval warfare were used to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.
See id. at 6.
" Saul H. Menlovitz & Burns H. Weston, From Geopolitics to Human Geogovernance:
Transition Steps, in PREFERRED FuUiREs FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 361, 366 (Saul H.
Menlovitz & Bums H. Weston eds., 1995).
9 See id.
10 This includes both arms control agreements presently in force and any future agreements
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5. Dissemination of information.
C. Characteristics
At least in the short term, the ISF will coordinate an international
collaborative effort to develop the technology necessary to accomplish these
goals. This emphasis upon technological development will have a two-fold
effect. First, ISF dollars will most appropriately be spent on contracted-for
research and development. Second, the ISF will at least initially be a small,
highly technical force comprised primarily of scientists, engineers, and experts
in military doctrine." These individuals could work for the ISF in various
capacities. One suggestion for a permanent U.N. force calls for the recruit-
ment of individual volunteers from all countries.'2 These volunteers would be
direct employees/members of the ISF. Another possibility, subsequently
discussed, is for states to make armed forces available to the ISF, in compli-
ance with a Security Council directive under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter. 3
A hybrid of both of these possibilities could also be an option.
Regardless of how "troops" are drafted, the ISF has the potential to serve
as a central repository for a potent, global talent pool. If given legitimacy by
the international community, the ISF could be an international juggernaut of
the best and brightest women and men the world has to offer. Given the oft-
demonstrated industry of man, one can only imagine what feats could be
accomplished by such an assembly of men and women.
Adequate funding for the ISF is absolutely critical to its success, and a
variety of options are available to generate these funds. The most obvious
option is simply to require nations to provide resources, financial and
that might limit space-based weapons. Notably, the ISF's performance of the verification
mission could reduce the anxiety that often occurs where one nation is supposed to verify
another's compliance with an arms agreement. See Bhupendra Jasani, Introduction to PEACEFUL
AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE 2 (Bhupendra Jasani ed. 1991) (noting the benefit of an
international verification process).
" Notably, this emphasis on technology is likely to have the added effect of creating a
substantial physical separation between human combatants and any actual weapons ofwar. This
feature should lessen what might otherwise be national reluctance to place soldiers in harm's
way in furtherance of an international effort.
12 Robert C. Johansen, Reforming the United Nations to Eliminate War, in PREFERRED
FUTUREs FOR THE UNITED NATIONs 147, 168 (Saul H. Mendlovitz & Bums H. Weston eds.
1995).
13 See U.N. CHARTER art. 43. Article 43 requires states to "make available (to the U.N.)...
armed forces, assistance, and facilities... necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security." Id.
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otherwise, in a measure appropriate to their capability. This sharing of costs
would enable even those nations contributing the most to divert funds, which
otherwise might have been spent on military development to other areas such
as education and other domestic needs. A more interesting proposal for
funding a permanent U.N. force involves the imposition of a "tiny tax on the
more than $900 billion of international currency exchanges that occur each
day."14 A tax of .01 percent, using 1992 numbers, would produce $28 billion
annually.' Certainly, the ISF would not receive the entire amount, but even
a moderate percentage of this sum would be an adequate beginning. There are
numerous advantages to such a tax, especially considering the fact that a
computerized system capable of making the necessary deductions from each
transaction is already in place. 6 Moreover, such a tax would not be levied
directly on governments, but presumably only upon those parties most capable
of paying, in proportion to their ability to pay. For example, the aforemen-
tioned tax of .01 percent would only deduct $100 from a transfer of $1
million.'7
Development of the confidence of nations is paramount at every step of the
evolution of the ISF. Open lines of communication, disclosure, and verifica-
tion are the nutrients that will help this confidence grow. Such procedures as
Rules of Engagement must be established to regulate any weapon system.'
An acceptable decisionmaking system is also critical. States must have
absolute confidence that the ISF will respond to aggressive action in their
defense. As the ISF develops and the international community gains
confidence in its ability to work with other nations toward the common goal
of collective security, the potential exists for the ISF to take on additional
missions, obviating certain efforts of individual nations.
III. PRIMARY PERSUASIVE FACTORS
This section evaluates five factors that bear heavily on the proposal for an
ISF. The first factor involves the principal counter-argument to establishment
of the ISF. There is a legitimate concern that an ISF will unacceptably limit




' Rules ofEngagement are rules developed to govern the actions ofnilitary forces. "[T]hey
are intended to describe clear circumstances and limitations under which... forces... may take
necessary action, consistent with legal, political, and military requirements." The Rules of
Engagement Forum (visited April 1, 2001) <http://www.rulesofengagement.com>.
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state autonomy, thereby affecting the balance of power in the international
community. The second factor involves a threat assessment to determine if
there is even a need for some organization to perform the kinds of missions
that would be undertaken by the ISF. Third, it is necessary to evaluate the
direction of the international community with respect to the militarization of
space. A conclusion that space will be merely an extension of the status quo
on earth could militate for the ISF. Fourth, this paper will address the
foreseeable future with respect to non-military space activities and the need for
a secure environment. The fifth and last factor involves a survey of the
direction of the international community with respect to interdependency and
related implications.
A. State Autonomy
The most substantial barrier to creation of the ISF is likely to be the
reluctance of states to accept new limitations upon their sovereign autonomy
to use force in space. This reluctance is likely to stem from one or more of
four perceived autonomy limitations. First, states are unlikely to accept limits
on their autonomy to unilaterally apply defensive force in space. However, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the ISF will not inherently limit
an individual state's ability to unilaterally deploy military assets in space
consistent with international law. The intent of the ISF is not to prohibit state
deployment of military assets in space, but to obviate the need and lessen the
incentive to do so.
Second, states will likely perceive an autonomy limitation with respect to
their ability to unilaterally utilize ISF systems. This is certainly a legitimate
concern that will take substantial effort and negotiation to overcome. An
acceptable result will likely include some form of agreed-upon, reliable Rules
of Engagement. Third, as a practical matter, states may perceive an autonomy
limitation due to resource limitations stemming from the diversion of
resources to the ISF. Yet, as long as states maintain the ability to utilize ISF
systems, they will likely have obtained more for their investment than they
could have acting alone.
The last and arguably most formidable autonomy concern is closely
related to the first three. The collaboration necessary for establishment of the
ISF, including sharing information, resources, and assets, will alter the
international balance of power. The ISF will constitute a powerful interna-
tional actor, which will interpose itself into the international balance of power
equation. The effect on individual nations will vary, increasing the relative
power for some and decreasing it for others. Admittedly, this is a legitimate
[Vol. 29:531
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concern, particularly for those nations such as the United States, which are
vulnerable to having their relative power diminished by the ISF.
Most important regarding this potential shift in the balance of power is the
connection between power and security.' 9 Certain nations will inevitably view
any diminution in their relative power as a correlative diminution in security.
Yet, this should not be considered a certainty; individual state power does not
directly equate to security on the international level. In fact, "the international
balance of military power, ... left unbridled, [is] ... a permissive, contribut-
ing cause of wars."20 While a full discussion of this topic is outside the scope
of this paper, the argument for the ISF is premised on the idea that collective
security, achieved by pooling resources and sharing responsibility, could
achieve a lasting peace where the paradigms of the past have failed. As one
author noted, "the most fundamental security problem for all countries remains
the insecurity inherent in the existing international balance of power
system... the U.N. system represents the only realistic hope of overcoming
this dangerous insecurity."'"
These state autonomy and balance of power concerns are of particular
significance when applied to the United States. Just as peacekeeping missions
simply "do not get off the ground without Great Power support,"' the ISF will
not come to fruition without the strong leadership of the United States, the
world's lone superpower. The United States has the "most dominant military
force in the history of the world," and it is the one nation potentially capable
of unilaterally achieving the goals of the ISF in the near term. Thus, the
" Robert C. Johansen, while advocating for a permanent U.N. military force, aptly summed
up the relative power/security dilemma:
Increasing the power of the world's symbolic political center [the U.N.]
causes separate States to feel less secure about protecting their security
interests against the center, however, not increasing the power of the center
causes States to feel insecure about protecting their security interests against
one another. This structural security dilemma acutely paralyzes the ability of
governments to achieve security. Until this structural problem is directly
faced, substantial security enhancements will be impossible. It is possible to
transcend the two horns of this dilemma by constructing a genuinely powerful
culture of enforcement within the U.N. context.
Johansen, supra note 12, at 1,56.
20 Id. at 149.
21 Id.
22 See William J. Durch, Getting Involved: Political-Military Context, in THE EVOLUTION
OF UN PEACEKEEPING 36 (William J. Durch ed. 1993).
2 Pauline Jelinek, Rumsfeld CallsforMissile Defense, A.P. ONLINE, Jan. 11,2001, in 2001
WL 3651485 (quoting Senator Carl Levine, the senior Democrat on the Senate Armed Services
Committee).
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United States arguably has the most to lose in terms of balance of power and
therefore, probably provides the largest obstacle to its creation.
It would appear that the United States is unlikely to acquiesce, let alone
lead the charge, to creation of the ISF without a paradigm shift in the way the
United States approaches national security. The United States would have to
believe that its interests are best protected by an international organization that
provides collective security. The ISF could be such an international organiza-
tion, a vehicle uniquely suited to equitably distribute the costs and benefits of
security. Still, the United States has been fairly clear that it will not accept
limits upon its autonomy in space.' The Clinton administration's official
policy, issued in December 1999, and entitled "A National Security Strategy
for a New Century," stated that "unimpeded access to and use of space is a
vital national interest."" However, as previously mentioned, the ISF will not
constrain state autonomy outside of any limitations in the Rules of Engage-
ment. Thus, as long as the United States only attempts to use ISF assets
consistent with these Rules, its autonomy will not be constrained. The larger
issue with respect to the United States will be its willingness to submit to a
diminution in its relative balance ofpower. A realistic assessment would have
to conclude that it is doubtful that the Unites States will be so willing.
However, there is an argument to be made that the United States might be
inclined to join in the creation of the ISF. First, the United States has
forcefully articulated its support for the ISF's first objective, namely, the
creation of a missile defense.26 The Bush administration has clearly indicated
strong support for some form of national missile defense, stationed in space
or elsewhere. 27 By selecting Donald H. Rumsfeld, an ardent proponent for a
national missile defense, as Secretary of Defense, President Bush "signaled
that the politically and diplomatically divisive goal of building a shield against
nuclear missiles will be at the core of the new administration's national
security agenda."2 In addition, General Colin L. Powell, U.S. Secretary of
State, made clear his views when he called a defensive shield "an essential
part" of the nation's security. 29 Thus, there is at least the remote possibility of
U.S. support for the ISF, given both the missile shield objectives of the Bush
24 See Caspar W. Weinberger, The Clinton/Gore Antimilitary Bias, FORBES, Jan. 2001, at
53.
2 Id.
26 Stephen Lee Myers, Choice of Rumsfeld Creates Solid Team for Missile Shield, N.Y.






administration and the resistance thus far put forward by the international
community to the U.S. initiative.
In addition, although such cooperation and communication as the ISF
would require might at first seem "naive and far-fetched," 30 multiple U.S.
presidents have made statements that suggest otherwise, that the sharing of
vital military information is possible and could create a more secure interna-
tional environment. President Eisenhower proposed, in July 1955, during the
Four-Power Summit Conference at Geneva, that the United States and the
Soviet Union "give each other a complete blueprint of our military establish-
ments."' Further, President Reagan stated his willingness to give the Soviet
Union the "secret of defense" if they would agree to eliminate all nuclear
weapons.32 Former President Nixon specifically provided a rationale for an
international anti-ballistic missile system when he stated:
We should formally offer to share any technology we
develop for a space-based missile defense system with the
Soviet Union or any other nation that joins us in seeking
meaningful arms control. If all nations could deploy the
system at once, none would suspect another of wanting to
use it as a shield for attack.33
Numerous multi-national proposals further support a conclusion that the
collaboration inherent in the ISF is a practical possibility and not simply a
pipe-dream. 3' For example, in 1957, western states, including the United
States, proposed the creation of an "inspection system which would ensure the
use of outer space exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.,
31
Similarly, a more modern example is the former Soviet Union's 1985 proposal
for the creation of a "World Space Organization," which would ensure
"international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space in the context of
its non-militarization. "
30 See HuRwrrz, supra note 4, at 182.
31 Id.
32 See id.
" Id. at 182-83.
34 See id. at 174.
'5 See id. (citing 1957 U.N.Y.B. 9).
36 See HuRwrrz, supra note 4, at 176 (citing Radio Moscow, Aug. 17, 1985 and Oct. 2,
1985).
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B. Missile and Asteroid Threat
Earth-launched ballistic missiles and asteroids (or comets) on a collision
course with Earth pose a threat that is understandably transparent to most
world citizens. The possibility of an asteroid strike probably sounds like little
more than fodder for Hollywood, rather than an imminent threat to be taken
seriously by average citizens. Governments, however, have responsibilities
that transcend those of regular citizens. The fact is that these threats are real;
so is the potential for mitigation through some form of military counter-attack
from space, such as that proposed as a function of the ISF. The following
discussion analyzes these threats.37
1. Missile Threat
Before surveying the missile threat, it is necessary to condition the
information that follows. The subsequent information tells only a part of the
story. It would be naive to suggest that all information regarding state military
capabilities is available to the public. If it were, there would be little need for
the various national military and civilian intelligence agencies whose primary
function is the acquisition of "intelligence" regarding the military capabilities
of potential adversaries. This situation is analogous to that of an iceberg. The
portion of an iceberg that is visible above the surface of the water represents
information available to the public. However, the portion of the iceberg
beneath the surface,38 hidden from sight and of unknown size, represents
confidentially-held military information. The significance of this for purposes
of this discussion is that the subsequent information alone paints a frightening
" This analysis does not reach threats other than the missile/asteroid threat, be they
terrestrial or extra-terrestrial. It is important to briefly note that many respected authorities are
convinced that "little green things" (some form of life) exist in outer space. Stephen Hawking,
the Lucasian professor of mathematics at Cambridge, a position once held by Isaac Newton,
certainly does, having provided this characterization. See Alan Taylor & lain S. Bruce, The
Universe? We're Across It, THE SUNDAY HERALD, Oct. 1, 2000 available in 2000WL26526045
(Scottish Media Newspapers Limited). In fact, the international community spends an estimated
25 billion dollars annually in pursuit of new planets and new forms of life. See id. Moreover,
Dr. Andrew Collier Cameron, leader of a team operating out of St. Andrews University in
Switzerland, which has recently located nine new planets orbiting distant stars, has noted that
"it is not inconceivable that in I I years or so we will be in a position to discover life on other
planets." Id. The import of this is that at least the potential exists for the ISF to be called on to
respond to as-yet unidentified threats.
"' Generally, about 6/7 of an iceberg's mass is beneath the surface of the water. See 20
BRITANNICA ENCYCLOPEDIA 751 (Fifteenth ed. 1993).
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picture of the potential for the proliferation and employment of weapons of
mass destruction. One can only imagine how much more frightening the
picture would be if all classified information were exposed to the public eye.
Although missiles are manufactured to travel a variety of distances, it is
the long range ballistic missiles that provide a target of opportunity for the ISF
since these missiles reach altitudes of 1,000 kn during their trajectories.39
There are essentially three different circumstances under which these long
range missiles are likely to be fired. Missiles may be fired in the course of a
traditional conflict, by a rogue nation or terrorist group, or under accidental
circumstances. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, George
Tenet, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
recently addressed the long range missile threat.' ° Tenet described the present
world situation with respect to proliferation of missile-borne weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) as "stark and worrisome."' Notably, at least sixteen
different countries, including North Korea, have the Scud missile system or a
more advanced ballistic missile system in their inventories."2
Tenet acknowledged the long range missile threat posed by Russia and
China, two nations that pose a threat to the United States in the context of a
traditional conflict. Tenet was confident, however, that mutual deterrence and
diplomacy would continue to serve as adequate safeguards."3 Still, it is
believed that China maintains up to two dozen long-range nuclear missiles,
housed in silos." While these have become increasingly outdated, China is
developing new, advanced, mobile missile technology."' Russia, on the other
hand, like the United States, maintains thousands of long range nuclear
weapons.'
Tenet was clearly more concerned about a number of emerging threats.
These could be classified as non-traditional, rogue nation, or terroristic threats.
39 See Jasani, supra note 10, at 2.
4 See The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security Before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of George J. Tenet,
Director of Central Intelligence) <http://www.odci.gov/cia/public-affairs/speeches/archives/
2000/dcLspeech_020200.html> (visited April 1, 2001) (last updated March 5, 2001)
[hereinafter Tenet].
41 id.
42 See Anderson, supra note 2, at 22 (citing Charles A. Homer, Space Systems Pivotal to
Modern Warfare, DEF. 22, Issue 4 (1994)).
4. See Tenet, supra note 40.
44 Erik Eckholm, Experts Try to Make Missile Shield Palatable to China N.Y. TIMEs,
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"Over the next 15 years... our cities [in the United States] will face ballistic
missile threats from a wider variety of actors-North Korea, probably Iran,
and possibly Iraq. 4 7 In fact, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld,
oversaw a commission in 1998 which, in contrast to U.S. intelligence agencies,
determined that "rogue" nations could pose a ballistic missile threat to the
United States sooner than analysts predict." In some cases, this is because of
indigenous technological development, and in other cases, because of direct
foreign assistance.
James Mulvenon, an expert on the Chinese military at the Rand Corpora-
tion, recently expressed the concern that China might provide such foreign
assistance to rogue nations. He noted that the "real worry" is that China may
supply missiles to the very countries the United States' proposed missile shield
is intended to protect against.4 9 In addition, previous weapons technology
importers, such as Iran, may become suppliers. Intelligence reports foretell
that in the next few years, Iran may be able to supply not only complete Scuds,
but also Shahab-3 missiles and related technology.5 Iraq could also become
a supplier in the next few years."1 In addition to these national suppliers, there
is a further risk that new or nontraditional nuclear suppliers could emerge.
Further, many nations have an increasing ability to not only import technologi-
cally skilled talent, but also to access the information needed to create a
weapons arsenal. s" While the missile arsenals of these countries will be fewer
in number, constrained to smaller payloads, and less reliable than those of the
Russians and Chinese, they will still pose a lethal and less predictable threat. 3
Lastly, there lurks the danger of an accidental missile fire. Such accidents
clearly do happen. For example, on December 28, 1984, an unarmed Soviet
cruise missile violated the airspace of Norway and Finland. Despite the fact
that the kinds of space-based anti-ballistic missile systems under consideration
7 See Tenet, supra note 40. North Korea has already tested a space launch vehicle, the
Taepo Dong-l, which it could theoretically convert into an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
(ICBM) capable of delivering a small biological or chemical weapon to the United States. In
addition, North Korea's Taepo Dong-2 missile may be capable of delivering a nuclear payload
to the United States. In just a few years, Iran also may be able to deliver an ICBM with a light
payload to the United States. The CIA also foresees that Iraq may obtain similar ability
sometime within the next decade. See id.
48 See Myers, supra note 26, at Al.
'9 See Eckholm, supra note 44, at A4.
0 See Tenet, supra note 40.
s, See id.




could not have destroyed this missile (in contrast to an armed ballistic missile),
the example is still illustrative of the danger.5
2. Asteroid (and Comet) Threat
The probability of an asteroid or comet strike, together with the almost
incomprehensible potential for catastrophic loss, demands an effective
approach to mitigating these threats. Such an approach must first include the
ability to identify and track asteroids or comets that have the potential to cross
Earth's path. Secondly, the approach must incorporate the ability to engage
and negate these threats. The ISF is arguably the only organization capable of
effectively pooling international resources and accomplishing both missions.
The Earth is no stranger to the effects of an asteroid or comet strike. For
example, in 1908, an asteroid estimated to be 200 feet across exploded about
four miles above Siberia with the force of 1, 000 Hiroshima bombs, burning
hundreds of square miles of trees in the Tunguska region.5 One can only
imagine the horrific loss of human life if such an asteroid had crashed into a
densely populated area such as New York City. As well, "[a]irborne blasts in
the kiloton to megaton range were observed in 1930 at the Curuca River in
Brazil, in 1947 at Sikhote-Alin, Siberia, in 1965 over Revelstoke, Canada, over
Ontario in 1966, and over Alaska in 1969."'  The most recent example of a
sizeable space rock actually crashing into earth occurred November 22, 1996,
when a meteorite struck a Honduran coffee field leaving a 165 foot wide
crater. 7 Of course, the most famous example of the destruction wrought by
an asteroid or comet involved the extinction of the dinosaurs. Scientists now
generally accept the once-revolutionary theory that 65 million years ago a
comet or asteroid six miles in diameter crashed into the Yucatan Peninsula on
the Gulf of Mexico, killing the dinosaurs and most other Earth species."8
Although of lesser notoriety, scientists also believe that a space rock of 3
to 7 miles in diameter crashed into Earth about 251 million years ago.59 This
rock is believed to have initiated what has been referred to as "the great
s See HURwrrz, supra note 4, at 183.
s See Kathy Sawyer, The Sky is Falling but Most Pieces Miss; Celestial Doomsday Rocks
not Imminent, Experts Say, THE WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 16, 1997, at Al.
56 Michael B. Gerrard & Anna W. Barber, Asteroids and Comets: U.S. and International
Law and the Lowest Probability, Highest Consequence Risk, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 4, 5 (1997).
S7 Id.
5' See Sawyer, supra note 55, at Al.
s9 See Paul Recer, Space Rock Blamed for "Great Dying" on Earth, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Feb. 23, 2001, at A18.
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dying ' " and the "mother of all extinctions."' Ninety percent of ocean species
and 70 percent of land species were extinguished within a short period of
time.6' It is believed that when one of these space rocks crashes into the Earth,
it can set off an "immense wave of superheated vapor that can roll for
hundreds of miles, killing everything in its path. "63 It is further thought that
these impacts "can cause tidal waves and send millions of tons of dust and
vapor into the atmosphere to darken the sun for months and chill the Earth.""
In addition to the actual crashes, there have also been near misses. On March
22, 1989, an asteroid crossed the Earth's orbit at a place where the planet had
been only six hours earlier." This asteroid, labeled 1989 FC, came within
690,000 kilometers of Earth--"a near miss in astronomical terms."
As previously mentioned, the ISF will initially conduct a comprehensive
risk assessment to identify and then track space objects which have the
potential to impact Earth. The heart of this risk assessment is the location and
identification of the estimated 2000 asteroids and comets approaching one
mile in diameter, which could someday cross Earth's orbit.67 Scientists
estimate that it would take an object at least one mile in diameter to cause
global ecological destruction." Unfortunately, world astronomers to date have
only located about 10 percent of this number-I 80 asteroids and twenty-six
comets." Notably, none of the catalogued near-Earth objects are expected to
collide with Earth for at least 200 years, but confident predictions of the
remaining 1800 cannot be made until they are discovered and their orbits
calculated to see if they will cross Earth's orbit.70 Moreover, astronomers have
even less information on long-period comets, which approach from outside the
solar system and can be significantly more difficult to identify.7' In a worst
6 See id.
61 See id. (quoting Luann Becker, geochemist and author of a study of this event at the
University of Washington). In the way of evidence, scientists have discovered deposits in China
and Japan of buckminsterfullereness, or "buckyballs"--a "form of carbon shaped like a
volleyball with a hollow cagelike cavity inside." Id. Scientists have "found within these cavities




6' See Gerrard & Barber, supra note 56, at 5.
"Id.
67See Sawyer, supra note 55, at Al.
68 See id.
See Gerrard & Barber, supra note 56, at 6.
o See id. at 7.71 See id.
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case scenario, comets approaching from the direction of the sun and hidden by
the glare may not be located until only a few days or hours before collision.
A 1992 proposal made by advisers to NASA is an example of the kind of
effort that would be necessary to locate these Earth-crossing asteroids. The
NASA advisers called the effort the Spaceguard Survey and determined that
six 2.5 meter telescopes strategically stationed around the world would be
capable of detecting 90 percent of all Earth-crossing asteroids larger than a
kilometer across.7 At the time of the proposal, the effort would have initially
cost $50 million and required $10 million in annual operating costs. 3
Locating an asteroid or comet may be the easy part. The more difficult
challenge will likely be the development of counter-measures capable of
dealing with an asteroid or comet, once identified as on a collision course with
the Earth. As one NASA official put it, "there is at present no response that
has a high probability of success."'74 Yet, possible solutions have been
proposed that generally involve destroying or deflecting the approaching
asteroid or comet." Various methods include: nuclear warheads, pulsed lasers,
kinetic energy deflection, and very large solar sails that would be attached to
the asteroid to capture radiation so as to exert pressure to move it off its
course.76 Notably the use of certain of these countermeasures-nuclear
warheads, for example-may implicate international treaty prohibitions and
thus, appropriate changes to the law would have to be made.
3. Response Mechanism
There are presently two potential approaches to dealing with these threats.
The first is for capable nations, such as the United States, to respond
unilaterally with whatever capabilities they maintain. The next section will
discuss U.S. efforts to develop such capability. Regardless, U.S. capability
does not mean global protection and will assuredly add to existing interna-
tional insecurity and dissension. A second approach could involve a
spontaneous, ad hoc amalgamation of the capabilities of individual nations.
This could be organized by the United Nations, but would likely be another
example of the "UN's cottage industry approach to planning, financing,
command, and control." Moreover, this amalgamation is likely to be beset
72 See id. at 8.
7 See id.
74 Id. at 12.
7s See Gerrard & Barber, supra note 56, at 10.
76 See id. at 12.
7 William J. Durch, Epilogue: Peacekeeping in Uncharted Territory, in THE EVOLUTION
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by "delays that occur in deploying ad hoc forces,... fears that ad hoc U.N.
forces will not be impartial or effective,... difficulties in recruiting and
deploying ad hoc forces .. and... problems arising when attempting to
integrate nationally diverse forces under a unified U.N. command. Both of
these approaches are patently unsatisfactory in that they fail to create a reliable
international capability to respond globally to the aforementioned threats. This
opens the door to a third option-a planned, cooperative, international effort
led by the ISF.
C. Space Militarization: Where We Are and Where We Are Going
Space has been, presently is, and will continue to be militarized.
Moreover, "[s]pace and military technology have gone hand in hand since
Hitler's V2 rockets became the basis of the early Apollo missions."79 The
conclusion that space will continue to be militarized is almost unassailable in
light of: 1) the lessons of history regarding the nature of man; 2) national
policies toward space militarization; and 3) the present and expected future
practices of nations with respect to space militarization. This conclusion is
important for two reasons. First, it should foreclose the wasteful dialogue
carried on by those who pray for the demilitarization of space. Second, it
demands a proactive, pragmatic approach to space in order to prevent "this
century, so plagued with war and suffering, [from] ... pass[ing] on its legacy
to the next."" This note constitutes an assessment of one such pragmatic
approach-the ISF.
1. History and the Inherent Nature of Man
Twenty million children, women, and men have been killed in over 100
major conflicts around the world since the end of World War II and the
creation of the United Nations."' Could even the most idealistic world citizen
plausibly argue that the international community has seen its last armed
conflict? The shortest and best answer is "no." It is also inevitable that space
capable nations will attempt to exploit space in effort to gain military
advantage in future conflicts. From the longbow to the nuclear warhead,
OF UN PEACEKEEPING 463, 463 (William J. Durch ed., 1993).
n JOHANSEN, supra note 12, at 168.
Taylor & Bruce, supra note 37.
o Annan, supra note 1.
, See LouIs HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1001 (3rd ed. 1993) (citing the UN
Secretary-General's report entitled "An Agenda for Peace").
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mankind has continually demonstrated his willingness to use the newest, most
effective technology available to accomplish his military and strategic aims.
Man is an aggressive, competitive, and combative creature. One need only
page through a newspaper or history book to find it replete with examples of
the violence one man is willing to perpetrate upon another in the name of one
cause or the next. Better yet, stand outside an American schoolyard, watch the
children play, and put these assertions to the test. Whether this behavior is
learned, innate, or a combination of the two, there is little evidence to suggest
that a change in the basic nature of man is forthcoming.
2. National Policies Toward Space Militarization
Although the rhetoric of most nations would seem to indicate a common
preference for demilitarizing space, a closer look reveals a sharp divergence
of position. On the one hand is the U.S. position, embodied in a statement by
General Colin Powell while he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
"Gulf War taught us that the United States must'achieve total control ofspace
if [it is] to succeed on the modern battlefield.' ",82 Having been recently
appointed Secretary of State, Powell brings these views to the national security
team, where they can reasonably be expected to influence future U.S. military
development.
On the other hand are those nations, such as Russia and China, which
claim to desire complete demilitarization. The Chinese Ambassador to the
United Nations on Disarmament recently voiced his country's view that "[t]he
prevention of an arms race and the prohibition of weapon systems in outer
space will ... exempt outer space from wars ... [and will] be crucial for
maintaining peace, security, and stability on the Earth."' Moreover, the
Chinese ambassador, in a statement seemingly targeted at the United States,
stated that "attempts to seek so-called 'absolute superiority' for oneself at the
expense of the security of others will definitely go nowhere and benefit
nobody."'" In addition, Russian President Vladimir Putin, who ostensibly
Anderson, supra note 2, at 21 (citing Colin S. Gray, Space Power Survivability,
A1RPWER J., at 27 (Winter 1993) (emphasis added). The reason why control of space is
important will be subsequently discussed. Suffice it to say for now that, as noted by Major
Douglas S. Anderson, space is the "ultimate high ground" and "[i]t is axiomatic to military
commanders that possession of the high ground usually means the difference between victory
and defeat." Id.
" Envoy at UN Opposes Outer Space "Arms Race," BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD
BROADCASTS, Oct. 5, 2000.
" Id.
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holds to the same position, initiated and hosted in April 2001 an international
conference aimed at preventing an arms race in space. 5 Participants from the
United States and Great Britain were noticeably absent
6
While even the United States would concur in the desire to prevent an
arms race in space, the position advocated by Russia and China with respect
to the complete demilitarization of space is neither honest nor practical. It
may be dishonest since these nations recognize the United States' superior
ability to develop military space capability and therefore, they advocate
restraint simply because they do not have the economic or technological
capability to compete.87 Presuming for the sake of argument that the position
of Russia and China is actually based on principle and not merely on the desire
to freeze the balance of power, their prayer for demilitarization is still
untimely and impractical. It is untimely because, as will be discussed
subsequently, the militarization of space has already commenced and, once
begun, there is no going back. Moreover, it is impractical given the previously
discussed, inherent, or combative nature of man proven time and again
throughout history. The persistent lack of an international, comprehensive
agreement on nuclear disarmament supports this argument. The same
obstacles that thwart such an agreement with respect to nuclear arms are likely
to stymie a space agreement as well. 88
" See Colum Lynch, UN. Summit Ends with Ambitious Declaration; Pledge on Poverty,
AIDS, and Peacekeeping No Cure for Finances, Mideast Stall, THE WASHINGTON POST, Sept.
9,2000, at A16. See also Fred Weir, Russia Honors First Space Hero, THE TORONTO STAR,
Apr. 12, 2001, Edition 1.
6 See id.
" The irony of Russia's position is worth mentioning. It was the Soviet Union and its allies
which opposed U.S. proposals in 1957 to create an inspection system that would ensure that the
sending of objects into outer space would be exclusively for scientific and peaceful purposes.
See Jasani, supra note 10, at 7. This was at a time when the Soviet Union had already launched
two artificial satellites and the United States had launched none. See id. Now, their roles having
reversed, Russia, successor to the Soviet Union, has called for complete demilitarization at a
time when it fully realizes the United States' lead in space.
8 Professor Henkin has provided two explanations for the lack of a comprehensive
disarmament agreement on Earth which are applicable to this discussion. One explanation is that
states simply refuse to bargain away what they perceive as the" 'basics of national survival."
Adequate weapon systems lie at the core of the basics necessary for defense of the state, and
states simply will not bargain them away, whether on Earth or in space. A second explanation
is that states may theoretically be open to comprehensive disarmament, but will only be moved
to make such a "radical readjustment" in response to "unusual fears and crises." It is uncertain
what kind of fear or crisis would qualify but obviously the invention of weapons of mass
destruction is insufficient. Henkin provides, by way of explanation, that this may be due to the
belief that large weapons cannot truly be disarmed because the knowledge of how to make new
ones cannot be eradicated. Further, weapons stockpiles can be placed beyond the reach of
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These disparate views arguably open the door to the ISF as a compromise
solution. Russia, China, and others who advocate demilitarization simply will
not have their way in the face of the evident U.S. intent to control space. The
ISF, however, could be a compromise solution wherein these nations could
contribute to and share in collective security, and work towards arms control
measures.
3. National Military Practices in Space
As discussed with respect to the missile threat, this section can only hope
to tell a part of the story of national military practices in space. Consistent
with the aforementioned analogy to an iceberg, the subsequent facts represent
only those facts which are visible and available to the public. The significance
of this for purposes of this paper is that the "visible" information available to
the public alone convincingly establishes that space presently is and in the
future will be militarized. One can only imagine how much more convincing
the proof would be if otherwise "confidential" information were exposed.
At least as far as one can find in publicly available information, nations
have not yet deployed actual weapon systems in space. As previously
mentioned with respect to the Persian Gulf War, however, they have used
satellites to perform military support missions. 9 These "military satellites"' 9
take a variety of forms to include reconnaissance satellites for target
identification,9 communications satellites for command and control, and
navigation satellites which are used to guide weapons to their targets.92
Military satellites are, in essence, "components of terrestrial weapon
detection, and delivery vehicles can be hidden or "hardened" to the point of indestructibility.
See HENKIN, supra note 8 1, at 1044. In the absence of a sufficient fear or crisis, it is reasonable
to find space demilitarization equally as unlikely as comprehensive disarmament.
89 See Peter Jankowitsch, Legal Aspects of Military Space Activities, in SPACE LAW:
DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 144 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1992).
90 An example of a satellite used for military purposes is the Lacrosse imaging satellite,
deployed by the U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) at a cost of $1.5 billion. See
Robert A. Rainey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F.L.
REV. 1, 15 n.53 (2000) (citing C. Couvalt, Secret Relay, Lacrosse NRO Spacecraft Revealed,
Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 23, 1997, at 27). The Lacrosse, originally developed in 1986 to
track the weaponry of Warsaw Pact countries, uses radar to obtain images through darkness,
foliage, or clouds, and produces images with resolution down to one meter. See id.
9' Reconnaissance satellites are also used for "tracking fleet movements, identifying supply
and transport facilities, monitoring air activities, intercepting communications, warning of
enemy preparation or attack, and so on." Jankowitsch, supra note 88, at 144.
' See Jasani, supra note 10, at I. Navigation satellites are also used by military forces to
provide three-dimensional positions worldwide. See Jankowitsch, supra note 88, at 144.
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systems." 93 Importantly, these satellites form merely the leading edge of
military space technology.
Primary prospective military technologies include anti-satellite (ASAT)
weapons, anti-ballistic missile (ABM) weapons, and space-based nuclear
weapons.' The heart of ASAT and ABM systems is likely to be laser
technology currently under development. The potential of the laser as the
"bullet" of the future is breathtaking. A laser beam, which travels at 186,000
miles per second, could cover thousands of miles in less time than a missile
can travel a few feet.95 A powerful, 100-megawatt laser could knock out a
missile by puncturing its thin skin with a pointed attack, striking with a force
equal to that of hand grenade. 96 The U.S. Army is already testing lasers and,
most specifically, their ability to target an orbiting satellite. In October 1997,
the Army targeted a U.S. Air Force satellite with the MIRACL (mid-infrared
advanced chemical laser) laser from White Sands Proving Ground in New
Mexico.97 Undoubtedly, the United States and other nations are highly
motivated to develop this laser technology and related ASAT ability, as well
as corresponding satellite protection measures."
Space-based anti-ballistic missile (ABM) programs are also currently
under development. Former Chairman of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (COPUOS), Peter Jankowitsch, has described what would be
required of an effective ballistic missile defense system." "[K]inetic-energy
" Jasani, supra note 10, at 1.
9' See Jankowitsch, supra note 89, at 144.
9' See Ben Bova, Laser Foes Forget Crossbow's History, USA TODAY, January 7, 1998, at
15A.
96 See id.
9" See id. The MIRACL was fired two times at an aging satellite in order to (as articulated
by the Pentagon) "measure the vulnerability of American satellites to laser attack." In Test,
Military Hits Satellite Using a Laser, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1997, at 18A.
" See Jankowitsch, supra note 89, at 145. Elementary military doctrine provides the
underlying reason why satellites are so important and why they are able to perform the
aforementioned functions. Satellites in essence sit atop the "high ground," a vantage point
which offers tactical advantage to whoever holds it. The goal of an ASAT system is to eliminate
an opponent's tactical advantage by destroying a satellite's ability to function, thereby blinding
the opponent. See generally Anderson, supra note 2, at 20.
9 The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was established as an ad hoc
committee in 1958 by the U.N. General Assembly, and became a permanent body the next year.
See Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, The Lawmaking Process in the United Nations, in SPACE LAW:
DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 33,43 n. I (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1992). The Committee was
charged with reviewing "practical and feasible means for giving effect to programs in the
peaceful uses of outer space which could be undertaken under United Nations auspices." Id.
The Committee was further asked to organize the exchange of information regarding outer space
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and directed-energy space weapons would need effective target surveillance
and acquisition systems, decoy discrimination capability, pointing and tracking
systems, kill assessment capability, and infallible command and control
arrangements."'" Such a system, particularly one deployed by the ISF, would
provide world-wide coverage. At least one author has suggested the benefits
of a satellite-based system: "Satellites capable of destroying ballistic missiles
over intercontinental ranges might be an enormous stride toward world peace.
Such satellites orbit the entire world. With the proper political control, they
could be used to protect every nation against attack by any nation-or terrorist
group.' 01 ' In the absence of an ISF, the United States is likely to be the first
to deploy a space-based ABM system. The United States has maintained one
missile defense program or another since 1956,"° with the most recent effort
under the auspices of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO). It was
former U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, however, who initiated the concept of
a space-based missile defense program, called the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI). 3 Reagan challenged U.S. scientists to "render nuclear weapons
'impotent and obsolete.' "," This challenge remains unmet.
Although the U.S. missile defense concept has undergone a number of
changes over time, it remains alive today. In 2000, the U.S. Pentagon spent
$4.8 billion on developing and testing a limited missile defense system only
to have the test fail.V 05 Moreover, one of President George W. Bush's top two
research and to encourage national research programs. Lastly, the Committee was directed to
study legal issues that might arise from space exploration. See id.
'o See Jankowitsch, supra note 89, at 144-45.
101 Bova, supra note 95, at 15A.
'" The United States Army's Nike-Zeus program in 1956 was the United States' first effort
to develop a ballistic missile defense system. See Anderson, supra note 2, at n.37 (citing John
E. Parkerson, Jr., International Legal Implications ofthe Strategic Defense Initiative, 116 MIL.
L. REV. 67, 73). However, it was President Ronald Reagan who initiated a space-based
defensive concept--the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)-in the early 1980s to "counter the
awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive." See Anderson, supra note 2,
at 22 (citing President Ronald Reagan's speech, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,1983, at A20). "President
George Bush streamlined the scope of SDI, renaming the program the Global Protection Against
Limited Strikes (GPALS)." Anderson, supra note 2, at 22-23 (citing Charles Shotwell et al.,
United States Air Force, Ballistic Missile Defense for the Twenty-First Century, AIRPOWER J.,
Special Ed. 1994, at 47). It was President William Clinton who changed the name to the
Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO), but maintained the focus on a space-based defense
system. See Charles Shotwell et al., United States Air Force, Ballistic Missile Defense for the
Twenty-First Century, AIRPOWER J. Special Ed. 1994, at 44, 47.
,0 SDI has been commonly (and sometimes derisively) referred to as "Star Wars."
'o See Jankowitsch, supra note 89, at 143.
'o See Myers, supra note 26, at Al.
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defense goals is to field a national missile defense system.3 6 Although the
early focus has been on fielding a ground-based defense system, President
Bush has advocated expanding research into sea and space-based systems."7
This effort would be consistent with a law, passed by Congress and signed by
former President William J. Clinton, which required the deployment of an
ABM system as soon as technologically feasible.'0" In the words of Thad
Cochran, Senator from Mississippi, "I think the technology is ready."""10
Admittedly, there are many naysayers who consider these technological
possibilities, particularly those associated with an ABM system, to be
"technically fanciful.. '".. Perhaps these naysayers should address their doubts
to the many acclaimed scientists who "published 'proof [circa 1900] that
heavier-than-air flight was impossible.""' By the year 2000, hundreds of
people have flown to space. Given the explosive advance of military and
civilian technology just in the last 50 years, together with even a moderate
respect for the ingenuity of man, the label "technically fanciful" is simply
fantastic. All things created are the product of an evolution, as will be the case
with military space technology. Can there be any reasonable doubt that the
United States, let alone a U.S.-led international effort, will produce an ABM
system in the near future?
An additional issue with respect to the militarization of space is that
individual nations may choose to create their own space force. The United
States already has a space force organized as component commands of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, and falling under the overall control of the United
States Space Command (USSPACECOM). " Moreover, many have called for
the allocation of more assets to the Space Command. For example, U.S.
Senator Bob Smith (R-N.H.) has demanded that the U.S. Air Force commit
more resources to developing "space power.""' 3 In fact, he declared that he
had not taken the option of a separate United States space force off the table. "4
'o' Eric Schmitt & Steven Lee Myers, Bush Courts Key Lawmakers for Support on Defense




,"o Jankowitsch, supra note 89, at 144.
"' Taylor & Bruce, supra note 37 (citing remarks made by Dr. Patrick Collins, Azabu
University, Japan).
"Z See generally U.S. Air Force Space Command: Command News (visited April 16,2001)
<http://www.spacecom.af.milhqafspc/news/default.htm>.
"l See William B. Scott, US. Adopts 'Tactical' Space Control Policy, AVIATION WEEK &




While creation of the ISF will not prohibit the United States or other nations
from developing such a space force, it could have the effect of negating the
incentive.
A closely related issue of concern is that the international community may
presently but quietly be involved in an arms race in space. Such a race could
be limited by partial disarmament (presuming complete disarmament is
implausible) or arms control."' Given the aforementioned U.S. position, it
appears that arms control would be the only possible option. The concept of
arms control presumes that there will be a "dialogue to steer... [an arms] race
towards an equilibrium between the powers."" 6 The ISF could be a key player
in an arms control agreement, by both facilitating dialogue and assisting in
achieving a security equilibrium."7 The ISF, as a neutral and reliable
international actor, could provide stability by obviating the need for nations to
unilaterally expend resources in hot pursuit of military space capability.
D. Non-military Space Activities
Man's exploitation of space has begun. Public and private efforts, often
working in concert, are increasingly turning their attention to the as-yet
unfathomable opportunities in space. The most heralded recent example is, of
course, the international effort to establish a permanent human presence in
space on board the International Space Station (ISS). The ISS, with a
completion date of 2004, will cost over $40 billion and will be the product of
the collaborative efforts of the United States, Russia, 11 European nations,
Canada, Japan, and Brazil." 8 The ISS will in essence serve as an orbiting
international laboratory with select nations having additional individual
laboratories. "9
"s Disarmament is "the process arising from any measure taken on the basis of a legal
obligation entailing a reduction in the existing level of armaments." Jean-Pierre Cot & Pascal
Boniface, Disarmament and Arms Control, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND
PROSPECTS 811, 811 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed. 1991). The intent of arms control, on the other
hand, is "not only to limit the volume and growth of arsenals, but also to control the uses to
which existing weapons are put." Id.
116 Id.
.. A crucial part of the ISF's involvement would be the facilitation of "confidence-building
measures." These are measures taken by States which involve some form of information
exchange regarding military capacities, but which do not regulate arms. See id. at 812.
IS See Space Station Timeline (visited April 1, 2001) <http://www.msnbc.com/news/
220058.asp>. This Internet site provides a year by year, pictorial representation of the
construction of the ISS.
119 See id.
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Another example of the fusion of public and private energy in space is
NASA's upcoming $63 million effort to place an exploration vehicle, the
Lunar-Prospector, on the moon." ° The Lunar Research Institute, a private
company which has plans to mount a mining operation on the moon, has
provided the majority of the funding.' 2' Similar mining operations have been
discussed with respect to asteroids as well.'" One step in this direction
occurred in February, 2001. Scientists responsible for the NEAR (Near Earth
Asteroid Rendezvous)-Shoemaker, a deep space robot ship which had orbited
the Manhattan-sized asteroid, Eros, for 11 months conducting a geologic
study," crash-landed the probe onto the asteroid. 2 The import of this crash-
landing is that it would seem to be a precursor to controlled landings, with the
subsequent potential for industrial exploitation.
In addition, the space tourism industry may well be initiated on April 30,
2001. On that date, former NASA engineer turned investor millionaire,
Dennis Tito, is expected to launch for the ISS, as long as he receives the
necessary approvals.'2 He will spend six days on board as both a tourist and
as an assistant to the crew, helping with a variety of tasks to include the
transfer of supplies and scientific experiments.' 6 Although Tito agreed not to
disclose the "ticket price," it is widely believed to be about $20 million. Given
the large number of millionaires around the globe and the need of most
national space programs for money, one can only wonder how many potential
"space tourists" are just waiting f6r their chance. 27 As well, it is expected that
120 See Taylor & Bruce, supra note 37.
121 See id. In addition, at least six other companies are presently preparing industrial
strategies to exploit space. See id.
", See James Chapman, Touchdown on an Asteroid, DAILY MAnL (LoNDON), Feb. 13,2001,
at2.
23 See Richard Stenger, NASA to Attempt Asteroid Landing in February (visited Jan. 4,
2001).<http://www.cnn.com/200lITECH/space/0l/04/asteroid.landingindex.html>. Shoemaker
beamed back to Earth approximately 150,000 images. See id.
2 See Chapman, supra note 122, at 2. Shoemaker had concluded its mission and its fuel and
funding were nearly gone. Although the probe was not designed to land, NEAR scientists
correctly believed that the probe could send back unprecedented, low altitude, high-resolution
pictures of the asteroid. See Stenger, supra note 123.
12 See Jim Banke, Space Tourist Pays His Full Fare (visited Jan. 2, 2001) <http://www.
mnbc.com/news/509288.asp>. Tito had originally arranged and trained for a flight to Russia's
Mir space station, but with Russia's decision to crash Mir and allocate their resources to the ISS,
Tito will head there instead. See id.
126 See id.
27 For example, a research company in Great Britain recently put the number of millionaires
in Britain alone at 73,990, and growing by more than 17 per cent a year. See Bill Jamieson, So
Now the Rich are Really no Different, and They Pay More Tax, THE SCoTSMAN, April 3,2001,
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"[o]nce travel to orbit falls in price... tourism and many associated business
activities in space, including space hotels, can all grow more or less without
limit.,,12
It is important to note the sheer volume of space activity expected to take
place in the coming years. For example, 2,035 commercial and government
payloads are proposed to be launched between 1998 and 2007.'2 The
realization of these goals will add to what the European Space Agency has
estimated to be 500 "live," operational satellites presently orbiting Earth, and
another 1,500 no longer alive but still in orbit."' Such a high number of
entries into space must be surprising to the uninitiated who at most are aware
of occasional U.S. space shuttle launchings. Many space activities, which just
a few years back would have been considered pure science fiction, are now
either in the planning or executory phase. "' Without a doubt, the future is
now.
Understandably, man's further exploitation of space is dependent upon a
stable environment in which investment can grow. Government and private
enterprise will be unwilling to invest in efforts jeopardized by the potential for
armed hostilities. This need for a stable environment in space is international
in nature, providing costs or benefits to all. Thus, it is appropriate that a
neutral but international actor, such as the ISF, be called upon to provide this
stability.
E. The Global Village and Collaboration to Solve Complex Problems
The progress of man, spurred by rapid technological advancement, has
linked the fates of all peoples. The satellite, which has the capability to
connect every human on the planet, is arguably the most celebrated example
of this technology. As noted by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, the satellite itself has ushered in the "phenomenon" known as
at9.
128 See Taylor & Bruce, supra note 37 (citing remarks made by Dr. Patrick Collins).
'29 See OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, HIGHLIGHTS IN SPACE 1998 2 (1998). This
number includes: Middle East-22; international consortia such as Intelsat and Inmarsat-25; Latin
America and the Caribbean-52; Asia and the Pacific Rim-140; Europe-208; Russian Federation-
241; United States-l,347. See id.
130 See Bruce Dorminey, In the Shadow of Sputnik, GEOGRAPHICAL MAG., Feb. 1, 1998, at
21. 2 ' A simple Internet search under "space" turns up an enormous volume of material
describing these activities.
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"globalization."' Globalization is in essence the process of creating what
some have referred to as a "global village." Mr. U.R. Rao (India), President
of the UNISPACE-III Conference, held in July, 1999, noted that "[tihe global
village is on the verge of transition from a concept to reality."'33  The
"[i]nterconnectivity of both natural and anthropogenic phenomena occurring
anywhere on earth,. .. [has] inextricably linked the fate of each country with
that of the world as a whole."''
Another way to describe this "linking" of fates might be to say that nations
have become interdependent upon each other, economically and otherwise.
This interdependency has resulted in what appears to be an international trend
toward collaboration to solve complex international problems. Nations
recognize their interdependency and the benefits to be gained by sharing costs.
Examples of this modern trend essentially fall into one of two categories: those
in which the collaboration is of a military nature and those in which it is not.
For example, the international community has collaborated in virtually all
recent armed conflicts, from the Persian Gulf War to Bosnia and Kosovo.'35
In fact, organizations such as NATO have been formed for the very reason of
collaborating in the use of force. Outside of the military paradigm, the
international community has collaborated with respect to the IMF, the WTO,
and the International Space Station.
Even those nations once considered closed to international involvement
have begun to recognize the benefits of joint ventures which benefit all. For
example, China has recently adopted new market rules as part of a "sweeping
overhaul of [its] ... economy accelerated by the country's effort to join the
World Trade Organization [WTO]" in early 2001.36 These rules allow
132 See Annan, supra note 1.
' U.R. Rao, Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful uses of
Outer Space (visited April 1,200 1)<http://www.un.or.at/OOSA/unisp-3/speeches/1 9rao.htm>.
UNISPACE-I was the third such conference in a series (1968, 1982, 1999) and the first U.N.
space conference since the end of the Cold War. See Space Benefits for Humanity in the 21st
Century (visited April 1, 2001) <http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/unisp-3>. At the conclusion to
the two week conference, the "Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development" was
adopted which laid out a "blueprint for the peaceful uses of outer space in the twenty-first
century." Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development Adopted by UNISPACE III
As It Concludes Two-Week Session (visited April 1, 2001) <http://www.oosa.unvienna~org/
unisp-3>.
'3 Rao, supra note 133.
13s See Jane Perlez, Arms Control Nominee Defends Shifting View, N.Y. TIMES, March 30,
2001, at A10.
3' Craig S. Smith, China at Gate of Profound Shift, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 28, 2000, at B 1.
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privately-owned companies access to the country's capital markets. 37
Previously, Chinese entrepreneurs were generally unable to raise money from
public investors without government support. "8 This overhaul is motivated by
Beijing's realization of the need to make its markets competitive vis d vis the
global competition with which China's markets will contend upon entering the
WTO.'39 Thus, even China desires a link to the international community,
albeit for self-interested, financial reasons.
One should not depart a discussion of globalization without attending to
those who may not share the benefits associated with global connectivity. The
Group of 77 developing countries, in particular, has voiced concern over the
perpetuation in space of the earthly world order with respect to the "haves"
and "have-nots."' 4 The spokesman for the Group of 77 developing countries
and China at UNISPACE I expressed the group's concern regarding the use
of outer space for military or military-related activities, and the fact that
military related expenditures account for a substantial portion of the total
money spent on space activities.14' These are certainly legitimate concerns.
However, as previously discussed, any inquiry regarding whether space ought
to be militarized is moot. The Group's concerns are more appropriately
addressed to the manner in which space will continue to be militarized. The
reality is that the Group of 77 will gain relatively much more through the
creation of an ISF than through a military free-for-all in space. The Group will
fall under the umbrella of protection provided by the ISF and as a partner, will
be privy to all military-technological developments. Moreover, they will gain
all of this while contributing quantitatively much less than more developed
nations.
In light of the interdependency inherent in the "global village," the
corresponding commonality of fate, and the ensuing international trend toward
collaboration to solve complex problems, the ISF appears to be a logical step
into the new frontier. Perhaps with the shared interests of the international
community should come a shared venture to secure these interests, together
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IV. COMPATIBILITY WITH GOVERNING LAW
In order for the ISF to be compatible with governing law, it need contend
with the following layers of law: A) the U.N. Charter; B) outer space legal
instruments; C) applicable treaties; and D) state domestic law. The ISF must
also contend with customary law, which will be addressed in connection with
each of these "layers." The conclusion to the subsequent analysis is that
changes will need to be made in order to ensure the legal viability of the ISF
and its acceptance by the international community. However, these changes
seem plausible if only because in many cases they would merely validate the
present practices of individual nations.
A. UN. Charter42
The directly applicable provisions of the U.N. Charter are those provisions
in Article 1 describing the purposes of the U.N. and those provisions in
Chapter VII which circumscribe the use of force.
1. Principal Purpose
The United Nations was created to do the "job" of ensuring "global
collective security."" 3 Article 1 expressly provides that the Charter's principal
purpose is "[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of
the peace .... "44 In plain terms, the purpose of the ISF is to assist the United
Nations with doing its "job." The ISF's express purpose of providing a
"collective defense against threats to the peace" closely aligns with that of the
United Nations. In addition, the United Nations purports to "develop friendly
relations among nations" and "achieve international co-operation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian
"42 The applicability of the U.N. Charter to space activities is affirmed by the Outer Space
Treaty's requirement that states parties carry on space activities in accordance with the U.N.
Charter. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) (hereinafter Outer Space Treaty or OST].
" William J. Durch, Peacekeeping in Uncharted Territory, in THE EVOLUTION OF UN
PEACEKEEPING 463 (William J. Durch ed. 1993).
244 U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. I (emphasis added).
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character."'4 s Given that confidence among nations is the sine qua non for
bringing the ISF to fruition, "friendly relations" are likely as a by-product.
Moreover, the proposed missions of the ISF target international problems- the
ballistic missile threat, the asteroid threat, and the lack of confidence in the
peaceful intentions of other nations.
2. Use of Force Provisions
The U.N. Charter generally prohibits the use of force. Article 2(4) of the
Charter requires members to refrain from the "threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."'" Notably, the
substance of Article 2(4) has become accepted as customary law and has
acquired the character ofjus cogens.47 This provision has been the subject of
much national and scholarly debate regarding the scope of its prohibition."
However, most importantly, while Article 2(4) 14 facially prohibits the kinds
of actions the ISF would take, at least two other Charter provisions-Chapter
VII and, particularly, Article 51-provide exceptions to the prohibition.
Chapter VII arguably provides authority for the creation of and use of force by
the ISF. Article 51, in particular, authorizes the use of force in precisely the
kinds of situations in which the ISF would be employed.
a. Chapter VII
Chapter VII appears to provide authority for the creation of the ISF and
authority for ISF use of force within limited parameters. Articles 39-43 of
Chapter VII work in concert to provide this authority. Article 39 of the
Charter authorizes the Security Council to "determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and ... make
recommendation, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
141 U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 1, 2.
' U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
"4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102, cmt. k, n.6.
"Jus cogens" refers to "a norm having the force of fundamental international law." Lawrence
W. Newman, Disputes With Foreign States, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, October 30,2000, at 3.
,48 See generally HENKIN, supra note 81 (discussing the predominant issues regarding
interpretation of Article 2(4)).
"9 Article 2(4) presumably applies to outer space, as it does to land, sea, or air. See
Jankowitsch, supra note 88, at 145.
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Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 150
In order for the Security Council to make the requisite Article 39 finding, it
will have to determine that one or more of the ISF missions, such as space
targeting of accidental ballistic missile firings, involves engagement of a
"threat to the peace." However, such a Council finding would be unprece-
dented. The Security Council has only found threats to the peace, breaches of
the peace, or acts of aggression on six occasions, all of which involved actual
instances of aggression."' Moreover, the Council only authorized use of
collective force in two of these situations-in response to North Korea's
invasion of South Korea and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 52
Despite the lack of precedent, there remains a strong argument that the
Council should still find a threat to the peace posed by rogue nation or
accidental missile firings, or asteroids. These might be referred to as threats-
in-waiting. The reason is that the technology does not exist to engage the
threats potentially targeted by the ISF. If the Council were to wait until, for
example, a rogue nation missile firing occurred or was imminent, an Article
39 finding at that point would be futile.
If the Council finds a threat to the peace, then under Article 42, the
Council may "take... action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace or security."'5 Outer space is not
specifically mentioned as an avenue through which the Security Council may
take action. However, this is most likely due to the technological limitations
at the time of drafting. An amendment here seems to be a reasonable change
to the law as it would comply with the ostensible intent of the drafters to fully
enable the Security Council.
Although Article 42 permits the Security Council to "take... action," the
Security Council has no organic assets with which to do so. Article 43
provides for this inadequacy: "(a)ll members of the United Nations, in order
to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake
to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with
a special agreement or agreements, armedforces, assistance, andfacilities...
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security."' 54
Article 43 is mandatory. It creates a legal obligation for Member States to
make available to the Security Council forces, assistance, and facilities.'55
"S0 U.N. CHARTER, art 39 (emphasis added).
' See HENKIN, supra note 81, at 968.
5 See id.
IS3 U.N. CHARTER, art 42 (emphasis added).
'4 U.N. CHARTER, art. 43 (emphasis added).
... See HENKIN, supra note 79, at 1003.
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Article 43 is the only article which appears to specifically authorize the
Council to take such action as the creation of an ISF. However, there is an
argument to be made that the Council has comprehensive authority to do so.
This authority was hinted at by the International Court of Justice in its
advisory opinion in the Expenses case. The Court rejected an inference that
the Council may only take measures under Articles 41 and 42, stating that it
could not "accept so limited a view of the powers of the Security Council."'56
Importantly, the Court's opinion "suggests that the Council could act on a
more liberal construction of its authority derived from its general powers to
maintain and restore international peace and security."' 57 These "general
powers" could further support the Council's creation of an ISF in order to
maintain international peace and security.
In addition, even Article 5 1, which recognizes a state's inherit right to self-
defense ultimately defers to the Council. Under this Article, the Security
Council "retains the authority and responsibility to take such action as it deems
necessary to restore international peace and security."'58 Thus, the Council
"may decide on the limits and objectives of the military action authorized as
collective self-defense."'59 Therefore, at least on paper, States parties to the-
U.N. Charter have already accepted Security Council authority over unilateral
and collective defensive actions.
b. Article 51 and the Right of Collective Self-Defense
The ISF will only engage in accordance with the Charter's Article 51 Self-
Defense exception. This exception allows for the "inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs."' 6 However, controversial
issues surround defensive use of force such that "the rules of self-defense fall
far short of a code of conduct that would provide precise 'hard law' for many
cases likely to arise. Accordingly, "[v]arying views have been advanced
by governments and scholars relating to the kinds of illegal force that would
trigger the right of an armed defensive response.' 62 There appears to be a
156 Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AJ.I.L. 452, 463 (1991),
reprinted in HENKIN, supra note 8 1, at 972, 976.
157 Id.
"a Id. at 975.
159 Id.
16 U.N. CHARTER, art. 51 (emphasis added).
16' OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 141-46 (1991),
reprinted in HENKIN, supra note 79, at 919.
162 Id. at 918.
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general consensus regarding the paradigmatic case, that where there is an
armed attack on the territory or instrumentality of a State. In such a case, use
of force is probably permitted under the Charter's Article 51 Self-Defense
exception. Thus, the ISF's engagement of an in-flight ballistic missile would
appear to be justified as against an armed attack. Such engagement further
comports with the International Court of Justice's statement that an armed
attack is the "condition sine qua non required for the exercise of the right of
collective self defense."'63
Outside the -paradigmatic case, however, state views vary. For example,
may a state mount an "anticipatory defense," such as a preemptive strike
where a ballistic missile has not yet been launched? "Most governments have
been reluctant to legitimize expanded self-defense actions that go beyond the
paradigmatic case."'" This reluctance is "evidehce of a widespread perception
that widening the scope of self-defense will erode the basic rule against
unilateral recourse to force."'165 However, there is a strong argument to be
made that self-defense is acceptable outside of the armed attack scenario,
provided that sharp limitations are observed. This argument flows primarily
from the view that Article 51 did not eliminate customary law's recognition
that the right of self defense goes beyond cases of armed attack.'" The often
cited formulation of this customary law was articulated by U.S. Secretary of
State Daniel Webster in a letter to the British Prime Minister in 1842 regarding
the Caroline. 67 Webster required that self-defense be limited to cases in which
"the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."' 6s Thus, ISF action that
conforms to this definition could be legally acceptable as an exception to the
prohibition against use of force. Moreover, it is conceivable that advances in
technology could enable the ISF to nearly instantaneously strike a missile pre-
launch, in a manner that conforms with the customary law definition.
Regardless, even if the international community refuses to allow the ISF to
make anticipatory strikes, that merely limits the timing and perhaps the
accuracy of the ISF engagement, but does not curtail the ISF's ability to
defend.
163 See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27).
'" SCHACHTER, supra note 151, reprinted in HENKIN, supra note 81, at 920.
165 Id.
" See generally Oscar Schachter, The Right ofStates to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1620, 1633 (1982), reprinted in HENKIN, supra note 81, at 926.
167 See id.
'6 The Caroline, 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906), reprinted in
HENKIN, supra note 8 1, at 872.
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As discussed with respect to Chapter VII, the self-defense exception is of
limited utility when applied to space. Man simply has not developed the
ability to defend from space. In circumstances where such defense is required,
the self-defense allowance is worthless. Further, as Article 51 states, nations
have an "inherent right" to self-defense.169 To limit states' ability to defend
from space is to violate this inherent right.
B. Outer Space Legal Instruments
The formal body of space law is comprised of five international legal
instruments. 7 The following discussion focuses on the first and most
important of these, the Outer Space Treaty, as it is the only instrument which
has gained general acceptance and which specifically addresses military
activity in space.
1. Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty, 7' adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966
and which entered into force in 1967, has come to be considered the "Magna
Carta" of international space agreements. 72 Despite the preeminence of this
Treaty, however, it does not adequately articulate the limits of acceptable
military activity in space, 7 3 thereby opening the door to varying state
interpretation. Disparate interpretation increases the probability of inconsis-
tency in compliance. The Treaty's inadequacies also complicate the
assessment of ISF compatibility. Amendment to the Treaty is necessary in
order to clarify the intent of the signing parties. 74 In addition, account must
be made for technological advances that have occurred since the drafting of the
' U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
170 See Spacelaw: Frequently Asked Questions (visited Dec. 15, 2000) <http://www.oosa.
unvienna.org/FAQ/splawfaq.html>. These include the following: (1) Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; (2) Agreement on the Rescue
of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space;
(3) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; (4) Convention
on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space; (5) Agreement Governing the Activities
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. See id.
171 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 142.
'7 See Jankowitsch, supra note 89, at 146.
173 See id.
74 See id. at 148.
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Treaty.'75 If an ISF is to be brought to fruition, still further amendment of the
Treaty may be necessary in order to permit the ISF to accomplish its mission.
Two provisions in the Treaty are germane to this discussion. The
Preamble articulates principles which have intrinsic importance and which are
also helpful in assessing the second critical provision, Article IV. Article IV
is the only provision that explicitly addresses and limits military activity in
space.
a. Preamble
While not binding, 76 the Preamble provides a number of principles, a few
of which are specifically helpful in determining whether the ISF comports with
the intent of the drafters. First, man has a "common interest" in the "use of
outer space for peaceful purposes."' This principle highlights arguably the
most controversial issue with respect to the ISF's compatibility with the
Treaty. Certainly the intent of the ISF is to universally safeguard man's
common interest in security, both on Earth and in space. However, the
question remains as to whether deployment of the ISF, a military actor,
comports with the principle that space be used for "peaceful purposes."
This principle of "peaceful purposes" is arguably the most controversial
in the entire Treaty and has received a substantial amount of scholarly
treatment. Interpretations range from calls for complete demilitarization of
space to those who believe that the military use of space is acceptable as long
as it is non-aggressive. 78 Support for the complete demilitarization argument
may be found in most multilateral agreements in which "peaceful" activities
are addressed; it is generally interpreted to mean non-military. 79 However,
there are treaties such as the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea in which
"peaceful" is meant to mean simply non-aggressive.' 0 Moreover, the "clearly
intentional" narrow scope of the specific prohibitions in the second paragraph
of Article IV support this contrary argument that complete demilitarization
was probably not the intent of the drafters. s'' In fact, military support systems
175 See id.
176 The Treaty expressly states that the parties only agreed to the articles. See Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 142.
'" See id.
17s See Jasani, supra note 10, at 16.
'7 See id. at 7.
'" See Ivan A. Vlasic, The LegalAspects ofPeaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE 38 (Bhupendra Jasani ed., 1991).
"' See Jankowitsch, supra note 89, at 147.
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existing at the time of the Treaty's entry into force are "generally accepted as
compatible with the Treaty."'8 2 The second preamble principle of note with
respect to the ISF is that outer space "should [be] ... for the benefit of all
peoples."'8 This principle is clearly compatible with the ISF as the core of the
ISF's purpose is to provide global security, which will benefit all peoples.
Lastly, the Outer Space Treaty's framers were clearly interested in "broad
international cooperation" and the positive impact such cooperation would
have on developing "friendly relations between States." This appears to be
consistent, as well, with the ISF as both international cooperation and,
arguably, friendly relations are essential to bring the ISF to fruition. Yet, the
drafters did not expressly nor implicitly advocate military cooperation.
Instead, they sought cooperation in the scientific and legal aspects of the use
of space for peaceful purposes. While it is admittedly a bit of a stretch, a view
of the ISF as in part a cooperative scientific effort aimed at promotion of
peaceful use of space is not unreasonable. As previously discussed, the ISF
will initially be composed of a "highly technical force, comprised primarily of
scientists, engineers, and experts in military doctrine."'"
b. Article IV
Article IV directly, though inadequately, addresses military activities in
space. The full provisions of Article IV are as follows:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or
any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in
outer space in any other manner.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses. The establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be
forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific
research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be
182 See id.
"3 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 142.
"4See discussion, supra p.7.
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prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary
for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial
bodies shall also not be prohibited. "
Analysis of Article IV reveals a number of potential obstacles for the ISF.
First, Article lV jeopardizes the ISF's ability to use the moon or other celestial
bodies for military purposes. The second paragraph of Article IV is quite clear
in its prohibition of military activities.'" While the ISF need not violate this
provision, a change to this provision would likely facilitate the ISF's ability
to construct a fixed, space-based operations center. In contrast to its absolute
prohibitions with respect to the moon and other celestial bodies, Article IV
would appear to allow the ISF to use space itself for non-aggressive and
defensive military activities (provided they comport with the U.N. Charter and
other international law). 8 7
The second potential obstacle in Article IV is the proscription of certain
weapons. The prohibition on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass
destruction's has instigated a substantial amount of disagreement over its
actual meaning and over what changes might be appropriate. There are
certainly those who would solve the dispute by a complete ban on all weapons
in space.' 89 However, the OST, by its terms, does not prohibit "the stationing
of defensive weapons in space."'" Moreover, as discussed with respect to
national military policies and practices in space, such a ban is simply
impractical. The question remains as to what kinds of weapons might fall
outside the Article's specific prohibition.
The implication is that conventional weapons and military support systems
(often components of weapons systems) are not banned. 9 However, due to
technological advancements since the drafting of the Treaty, the scope of
conventional weapons is uncertain. 92 For example, it is uncertain whether
developing laser and particle-beam anti-satellite weapons will be compatible
' Outer Space Treaty, supra note 137, art. iv.
11 See S. Chandrashekar, Problems of Definition: A View of an Emerging Space Power, in
PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE 81 (Bhupendra Jasani ed. 199 1).
187 See id.
"' "Weapons of mass destruction" are not "defined in the Treaty" but they are "generally
understood to include chemical and biological weapons also." Jasani, supra note 10, at 5.18' See Jasani, supra note 10, at 5. In 1979, Italy proposed a prohibition on "the development
and use of earth- or space-based systems designed to damage, destroy, or interfere with the
operations of other States' satellites." Id.
'g Chandrashekar, supra note 186, at 82.




with the Treaty.'93 One such "X-ray" laser is powered by a nuclear explosion,
giving rise to dispute over whether a nuclear-powered laser constitutes a
nuclear weapon. 9
The net effect of the lack of specificity in the Outer Space Treaty,
particularly with respect to the "peaceful purposes" provision in the preamble
and the prohibitions in Article IV, is that the legal alternatives available to the
ISF are uncertain. Modifications must be made to the Treaty in order to enable
the ISF to legally perform its proposed missions.
C. Related Treaties
In addition to the space agreements, a number of other international
agreements directly bear on the ISF's ability to perform its proposed functions.
The ISF must come to terms with, inter alia, the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty95 and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."
1. Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM Treaty
The ISF will violate the ABM Treaty in the absence of amendment. The
ABM Treaty prohibits nations from developing and erecting ballistic missile
defenses which are, inter alia, based in outer space. Thus, creation of an ABM
space-based system would be an express violation of the terms of the Treaty.
However, the policy underlying the Treaty was maintenance of the status quo.
This meant mutually assured destruction for the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, should one or the other strike. Underlying this
policy was a desire to preserve the balance of power. In contrast to the effect
of a lone nation developing a missile defense which it could unilaterally
deploy, an ISF-run system could neutralize any potential change in the balance
of power while providing the protection many nations desire. Thus, the ISF
is arguably compatible with the policy underlying the ABM Treaty, if not with
its express provisions.
As noted by Hurwitz, "if the ABM Treaty was amended (or if the Parties
were to withdraw from it), then a jointly (i.e., U.S.-U.S.S.R), and preferably
internationally owned and operated non-autonomous space-based missile
193 See id.
'u See id.
'"Treaty on the Limitation ofAnti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972,
23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7650 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
196 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter Test Ban Treaty].
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defense system would be legal.""7 Moreover, an international system may be
the only way to prevent the United States from developing a system solely run
by the United States. All indications regarding President George W. Bush's
intentions suggest that he will focus U.S. efforts on creating a system, be it
land, sea, air, or space-based.'" In fact, although President Bush and the U.S.
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld "have not advocated abandoning the
treaty, they have suggested that they will not be bound by its prohibition on
developing a missile defense."' 99
2. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, inter alia, outlaws the testing of atomic
weapons and atomic explosions in outer space.200 The Treaty could impact the
manner in which the ISF performs its missions by limiting the ISF's ability to
use nuclear energy. Thus, it may need to be amended to enable the ISF to
perform its mission. However, not all States have ratified this treaty, most
importantly the United States, so it may not prove a significant obstacle.
As recently as October 1999, the U.S. Senate rejected the Treaty by a vote
of51-48.20' If the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has his way,
the U.S. will not change its position. Rumsfeld has strongly opposed the
Treaty, opining that "[b]y weakening confidence in existing U.S. weapons
designs, and by inhibiting the development of new designs to respond to a
changing world, the C.T.B.T. (test ban treaty).., would have begun a slow
erosion of U.S. and allied confidence in our stockpile."2 2
There is, however, some reason to think that the U.S. may ultimately
change its position. A recently concluded study of the treaty by former
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John M. Shalikashvili,
determined that the United States must ratify the Treaty in order to effectively
limit the spread of nuclear weapons. As well, Colin L. Powell, newly
appointed U.S. Secretary of State, backed the Treaty in 1993 describing it as
"necessary for the safety.., of the world."2 °3 Moreover, the recent federal
election resulted in a 50-50 Republican-Democrat split in the Senate, and there
197 HuRwrrz, supra note 4, at 181 (emphasis added).
'"See discussion, supra p. 21-22.
'9See Myers, supra note 26.
200 See Test Ban Treaty, supra note 196.
'o' See Michael R. Gordon, Report to Clinton Asks US. to Ratfy Test-Ban Treaty, N.Y.





are many new faces. Still, it does not look good for Treaty proponents as the
U.S. Constitution requires a two-thirds vote to ratify a treaty and the Test Ban
Treaty has a long way to go.
D. State Domestic Law
Lastly, note must be made of the potential legal hurdle created by
individual state domestic laws, such as the U.S. Constitution. The extent of
this obstacle will vary from state to state and will implicate intra-national
politics as well. The United States, for example, has refused to honor Article
43's requirement that it earmark forces for U.N. peacekeeping operations.
This could be due to U.S. reluctance to either strengthen the relative power of
the United Nations or to place its nationals under non-U.S. commanders.' As
former Senator Bob Dole articulated in introducing legislation to prevent U.S.
soldiers from having to serve under a "foreign command," "our military
personnel should be asked to risk their lives only in support of U.S. interests,
in operations led by U.S. commanders."2'5 However, this statement presumes
that U.S. interests may not be served by U.N. operations. The previous
discussion regarding the inter-dependency of the world community would
suggest that almost any U.N. operation would at least in part serve U.S.
interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Sunday morning, December 7, 1941 was a day that will forever be carved
into the very soul of the collective American spirit.' On that date, "a date
which will live in infamy, 20 7 189 Japanese bombers struck Pearl Harbor,
leaving 2,433 dead, 1,178 wounded, 18 warships sunk, and 188 planes
destroyed."° It was this singular event which galvanized the resolve of the
American people to go to war, both in Europe and Japan.' The United States
and the international community must not wait for another Pearl Harbor-a
See Johansen, supra note 12, at 173.
See id. at 173 (citing Sen. Bob Dole, Peacekeepers and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
1994, at AI5) (emphasis added).
2W See PETER JENNINGS & TODD BREWSTER, THE CENTURY 230 (1998).
' See id. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt articulated these words in a speech to
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rogue nation missile strike or a catastrophic asteroid impact-to galvanize the
resolve necessary to thwart these and the other aforementioned threats.
Admittedly, the creation of an ISF will be no easy feat. There are strong
arguments to be made for and against such an initiative, and a formidable wall
of insecurity to be scaled. Yet, surely the tragedies that seed the field of
human history are sufficient to motivate citizens and leaders to overcome their
insecurities and open their minds to a new course for mankind. The ISF, as
described herein, may not be the perfect solution for the international
community. However, there is strong reason to believe that some similar form
of international military collaboration is the best and, more importantly, the
most practical solution among arguably undesirable alternatives. The
inevitable continued militarization of space, together with the ever-increasing,
interconnected and interdependent nature of international relations leads to this
conclusion.
Undoubtedly, such a collaboration will begin slowly and build
incrementally, with every gain in the confidence of nations. Such collabora-
tion will require nations to stretch themselves to fully appreciate the interde-
pendent nature of the global community, and then act accordingly. Nations
must think strategically with a far-reaching vision of the future of humankind
that transcends the coming decades and comprehends the coming centuries.
In this venture, leaders must lead. Women and men around the globe must
begin now, and seize the initiative, in order to provide some form of lasting,
reliable framework for peace in space.
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